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Abstract
This paper measures the eﬀect of China’s one-child policy on fertility by exploring
the natural experiment that has been created by China’s unique aﬃrmative birth con-
trol policy, which is possibly the largest social experiment in human history. Because
the one-child policy only applied to Han Chinese, but not to ethnic minorities, we
construct a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimator to identify the eﬀect of the policy on
fertility. Such a natural experiment is a rare opportunity, whether for the analysis of
the eﬀect on fertility or for the analysis of economics in general. Using two rounds
of the Chinese Population Census, we ﬁnd that the one-child policy has had a large
eﬀect on fertility. The average eﬀect on the post-treatment cohorts on the probability
of having a second child is as large as -11 percentage points. We also ﬁnd that the
magnitude is larger in urban areas and for more educated women. Our robustness tests
suggest that our diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates of the eﬀect of the one-child policy
are not very likely to be driven by other policy or socio-economic changes that have
aﬀected the Han and the minorities diﬀerently.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J13, J15, J18, O101 Introduction
China’s one-child policy is probably the largest social experiment in human history. Under
this policy, each household is allowed only one child, especially in urban areas. Women are
given birth quotas, and households are penalized for “above-quota births.” The policy was
started in 1979, and has since aﬀected the lives of more than one billion people in what
is the most populous nation in the world. This large social experiment provides a unique
opportunity for researchers to examine the impact of counter-natal policies, which rarely
occur in human history (Birdsall, 1988).1
The dramatic one-child policy has, unsurprisingly, spurred a vast amount of research,
in particular in the ﬁeld of demography. Surprisingly, however, no study has been able
to directly measure the eﬀect of the one-child policy on fertility. In the last two and half
decades, demographers, economists, and other social scientists have examined various aspects
of the one-child policy (Johnson, 1994; Li, 1995; Qian, 1997; Short and Zhai, 1998; McElroy
and Yang, 2000), but most of these studies have related the variation in fertility to the
variation in the implementation of the one-child policy across localities, and ﬁnd that these
implementation variables, such as ﬁnes for above-quota births, one-child subsidies, and the
provision of contraceptives, do indeed aﬀect fertility.
Another problem with these studies is that most of them have ignored the endogeneity
of the local policy variables. Tougher local implementation of the one-child policy may
be a result of high local fertility, in which case there is a feedback eﬀect from fertility
to local implementation. Tougher implementation may also be a result of omitted local
preferences, which aﬀect both fertility and policy implementation. An instrumental variable
(IV) approach may not help much to solve the problem, because it is hard to ﬁnd valid IVs
that are correlated with local policy implementation but not with fertility, either directly or
indirectly through omitted variables.
1Pro-natal policies, which occur more often, have been much better studied. Most empirical work ﬁnds
that pro-natal policies, such as child subsidies or tax deductions, have a positive eﬀect on increasing fertility.
See, for example, Whittington et al. (1990) and Zhang et al. (1994).
1In this paper, we attempt to directly measure the eﬀect of the one-child policy on
fertility. The main innovation of this paper is that we measure the eﬀect of the one-child
policy by making use of a natural experiment that has not been well explored by other social
scientists. A unique aspect of the one-child policy is that it is an aﬃrmative policy in that it
only applies to the Han Chinese women. Ethnic minority women in China were allowed to
have two children until the end of the 1980s (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, 1988; Park
and Han, 1990; Anderson and Silver, 1995; Peng, 1996; Qian, 1997), and thus the fertility
policy for the minorities is essentially a two-child policy.2
This aﬃrmative policy provides us with a unique opportunity to identify the eﬀects
of the one-child policy on fertility. Speciﬁcally, we use the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD)
estimator (Angrist and Krueger, 1999), which exploits the diﬀerences in the probability
of having a second birth between the Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, both for birth
cohorts that are aﬀected by the policy (post-treatment group) and birth cohorts that are
unaﬀected by the policy (pre-treatment group). For this purpose, we use the interaction of
the birth cohorts and a Han dummy to identify the exogenous variability in fertility that
can be attributed to the introduction of the one-child policy. This identiﬁcation strategy is
very clean, as we do not have to rely on local fertility policies, which are very likely to be
endogenous.
Drawing on two rounds of the Chinese Population Census that were conducted in 1982
and 1990, our DD estimations show that the one-child policy has indeed had a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on reducing the probability of second births among the Han Chinese compared to the
probability among the ethnic minorities. These two rounds of census allow us to identify
the pre-treatment group of birth cohorts of women whose second births were not aﬀected
by the one-child policy. Empirically, these are the 1942 and earlier cohorts, the women in
which were 37 or older in 1979. In both rounds of the census, the DD estimate is statistically
signiﬁcant for each of the cohorts for the period 1948 to 1962, whose ages were in the range
2Some minority-dominated autonomous regions may allow minority women to have more children. See
the next section for details.
2of 17 to 31 when the policy was introduced in 1979. The average eﬀect on the post-treatment
cohorts is -7.5 percentage points for 1982 and -11.0 percentage points for 1990. The largest
magnitude of 23 percentage points is identiﬁed for the 1958 cohort from the 1982 census.
The estimated eﬀects only change slightly when we control for the education of women, the
education of their husbands, and the rural and provincial dummies. When we conduct the
same analysis on diﬀerent sub-samples, we ﬁnd that the magnitude is larger in urban areas
and for more educated women. For example, the one-child policy has almost no eﬀect on
fertility for the rural illiterate group, but can be as large as -30 percentage points for some
urban cohorts with at least senior high school education.
To have more conﬁdence in the DD estimation, we need to make sure that it is not
mainly picking up the eﬀect of other policy shocks or economic changes. The key assumption
of the DD method is that without the one-child policy, the changes in the probability of
having a second child for the Han and the minorities would have been the same between
1979 and 1990. If there are other policy shocks or changes in social-economic variables in the
same period that have aﬀected the fertility behavior of the Han and the minorities diﬀerently,
then the DD method may have picked up the eﬀect of these policies or changes.
One way to test the validity of the key assumption for the DD estimates is to directly
examine whether other household decision variables, which may reﬂect parental preference
and the opportunity costs of children but are not likely to be aﬀected by the one-child
policy, have changed in diﬀerent ways for the Han and the minorities in the treatment
period. If there are other policies or changes of social-economic variables that have altered
the preference and costs of the children of the Han Chinese more than the minorities for the
post-treatment cohorts, then the DD estimator should pick up these eﬀects. To this end, we
use the DD method to estimate the probability of getting married and having a ﬁrst child.
Although the one-child policy could have a potential feedback eﬀect on these variables, in
that those who know that they cannot have a second child may marry late or have their
3ﬁrst child late,3 our estimates for these two variables are almost zero for all but the very
late cohorts. These results suggest that our estimates of the eﬀect of the one-child policy on
the probability of having a second child may not be mainly driven by other factors, because
these factors should have changed marriage and ﬁrst birth behavior in the same way if they
had aﬀected preference and child costs.
This study contributes to the fertility and economics literature in the following ways.
First, the DD method allows us to measure the fertility gap that is caused by the exogenous
variability of the one-child policy. To the best of our knowledge, no previous research has
even been able to directly measure this eﬀect, let alone establish causality. Second, and
more generally, the identiﬁcation strategy that is based on this unique natural experiment
can potentially be used to break endogeneity in other economic relationships. For example,
one could use the DD method as an instrument to identify the eﬀect of one more child
on parental labor supply, child quality, and the stability of marriage. In this sense, we
contribute to the literature that explores natural experiments in social settings (see, for
example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980 and 2000), Angrist and Krueger (1991), Ashenfelter
and Krueger (1994), Angrist and Evans (1998), and Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004)).
Finally, the empirical ﬁndings have some important policy implications. We ﬁnd that,
in general, the one-child policy has a large impact on fertility, although this impact varies
across groups. In particular, we ﬁnd that the policy has had almost no eﬀect on the least
well-oﬀ group, which consists of rural residents with little or no education. The purpose of
birth control is to enhance economic growth and increase household income, but ironically
the imposition of the one-child policy may not only perpetuate inequality, but also exacerbate
it. When the poor have many children, the life quality of these children is low and they will
also grow up to be poor.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy introduce birth
control policies in China, and especially look at how these policies diﬀer for the Han Chinese
3This feedback eﬀect should be smaller for women in the earlier cohorts, as they were more likely to be
married and have a ﬁrst child by the time the one-child policy started.
4and the ethnic minorities. In Section 3 we specify our empirical strategy, and in Section 4 we
introduce the data of the Population Census of China. In Section 5 we use the DD method
to measure the eﬀect of the one-child policy on fertility. Section 6 checks the robustness of
the DD method, and Section 7 concludes the study.
2 The One-Child Policy in China
China introduced its unique policy of one child per family in 1979. Under this policy,
each woman is allowed only one child. Women are given birth quotas, and households are
penalized for “above-quota births”. To implement the policy, local governments at all levels
are given incentive contracts in the form of ﬁscal rewards for fulﬁlling birth targets, and
heavy penalties for falling short (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, 1988; Short and Zhai,
1998). Moreover, government oﬃcials may be demoted for allowing too many above-quota
births in their community, which means that they will lose all future income and other
beneﬁts that are associated with government positions.
Birth control policies can be classiﬁed into two categories, national and local. National
policies, such as the one-child policy, are applicable throughout the whole country, but local
policies, such as penalties for above-quota births, may vary between regions, such as rural and
urban, or between provinces.4 In a sense, local policies are merely methods for implementing
the one-child policy of the central government.
A unique aspect of the national policy is that it is a policy that has aﬃrmative aspects
with respect to ethnic minorities. The government has enacted tighter control over the
birthrate of the Han Chinese women compared to that of ethnic minority women, who are
normally allowed to have two children (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, 1988; Park and
Han, 1990; Anderson and Silver, 1995; Peng, 1996; Qian, 1997). Although a third child is
not allowed for minority women in most regions, there are some exceptions. For example,
in Xinjiang Province, minority women can have as many as four children. In rural areas of
4The central government allowed each provincial government to draw up its own birth control regulations
or rules that are based on the national policies but incorporate local characteristics (CCCPC, 1984).
5Tibet, there are no restrictions on the number of children that minority women can have.
In April 1984, ﬁve years after the one-child policy was initiated for the Han Chinese, the
government for the ﬁrst time stated that there should also be birth control policies for
ethnic minorities, but that these policies should be less restrictive (CCCPC, 1984; Hardee-
Cleaveland and Banister, 1988). However, up to the end of 1988, minority women were
allowed to have a second child (Deng, 1995), and for ethnic groups with a population of less
than 10 million, a second or even a third child was allowed. Ethnic groups with a population
of more than 10 million were subject to the same policy as the Han. At the end of the 1980s,
only the Zhuang had a population of more than 10 million, most of whom lived in Guangxi.
On 17 September 1988, the Guangxi provincial government introduced the one-child policy
for ethnic Zhuang families (Guangxi Autonomous Government, 1988), and other provinces
started to apply the same policy in the 1990s. By 1990, the population of the Manchu, the
second largest ethnic group in China, had also topped 10 million, and they therefore became
subject to the one-child policy. To summarize, for most of the 1980s, minority women were
allowed to have more than one child, which provides a unique natural experiment with which
to test the eﬀect of the birth control policy on fertility.5
Local birth control policies, although generally tough, demonstrate great heterogeneity.
In particular, the penalties for above-quota births are much more severe in urban areas than
in rural areas (Banister, 1987). Urban citizens who violate the policy have to pay a ﬁne
that is proportional to their monthly salary, which is sometimes as high as 70 percent, and
can be demoted or become permanently ineligible for promotion if they work in state-owned
enterprises or institutions, which were the major urban employers in the 1980s. Furthermore,
above-quota children are not allowed to go to urban public schools, which receive substantial
education subsidies (Short and Zhai, 1998). In contrast, the only severe punishment in rural
5Even though the one-child policy applied to the Zhuang in Guangxi in September 1988, it only applied
to women who fell pregnant after the issuance of the policy. Generally speaking, the earliest time that these
women could have had a baby was July 1989, so this should have little eﬀect on our results, which are based
on censuses from 1982 and 1990. We have experimented with excluding the Zhuang from our samples and
ﬁnd that the results are very similar.
6areas for above-quota births is a one-shot ﬁne. Demotions or deprivations of the children’s
right to go to school are not important, because few rural citizens work for state-owned
institutions and public schools are badly funded in rural China. Moreover, even the ﬁne
may not be very eﬀective in rural areas, because many poor farmers cannot aﬀord to pay (Li
and Zhang, 2004). Because of the diﬃculties of implementation and potential social unrest,
in some rural areas and in certain years the policy is relaxed to allow Han women to have a
second child if the ﬁrst child is female (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, 1988; Qian, 1997;
Chow, 2002).
In addition to the urban-rural diﬀerence in fertility policies, there is also a large vari-
ation in policy across rural localities. Short and Zhai (1998) ﬁnd that 41 percent of the
villages in their sample have a strict one-child policy, 43 percent allow a second child if the
ﬁrst child is a girl, and the remaining 16 percent allow two children without conditions. In
rural areas, fertility ﬁnes have been the primary penalty that is used by local government
oﬃcials for above-quota births. Various studies have shown that the ﬁnes are heavy and
vary enormously across communities, ranging between 20 and 200 percent of a household’s
annual income (Li, 1995; Short and Zhai, 1998).
In the following analysis, we make use of the aﬃrmative one-child policy to explore
how national-level policies have aﬀected the fertility of Chinese women. The census data
that we draw on do not provide any information on local birth-control policies, and even
if we observe local policies we cannot easily use them as covariates, as previous work has
shown that local policies are endogenously determined (McElroy and Yang, 2000; Li and
Zhang, 2004). Rather than directly examining local policies, we add locality dummies into
our regressions to control for any potential diﬀerences across localities. As will be shown
later, these locality dummies do not aﬀect the results much.
73 Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Strategy
In this section, we introduce our empirical strategy for measuring the eﬀect of the one-child
policy on fertility. Essentially, the strategy is based on China’s aﬃrmative birth control
policy, which constitutes a natural experiment. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the coeﬃcient of
the interaction of age (as a measure of the timing of the policy, as women of diﬀerent ages
have diﬀerent childbearing periods that overlap with the period of the one-child policy)
and the Han dummy. Based on the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) method (Angrist and
Krueger, 1999), this interaction term can be used to identify the change in fertility that can
be attributed to the introduction of the one-child policy.
To understand this identiﬁcation strategy, we need ﬁrst to explain how the DD method
can be applied to estimate the eﬀect of the one-child policy on fertility. The DD method
works because the one-child policy only applied to the Han Chinese. Thus, we have the Han
Chinese as the treatment group and the ethnic minorities as the control group. A distinct
feature of the birth-control policy is that the timing of the treatment is not discrete, that is,
there is no simple distinction between no treatment and treatment, as would be the case in
most situations to which a DD method might be applied, such as joining a training program.
Rather, the treatment is a matter of degree that decreases with the age of a woman. For
example, a Han woman who was 25 years old in 1979 was more aﬀected by the one-child
policy than a Han woman who was already 50 years old in that year, because the older woman
had fewer childbearing years left. Thus, we need to identify the pre-treatment group, which
includes women of those birth cohorts who had their second child before the implementation
of the one-child policy. We oﬀer details on the identiﬁcation of the pre-treatment group in
Section 5.1.
We use the DD framework to control for systematic diﬀerences both across ethnic
groups and across birth cohorts.6 Diﬀerencing fertility across ethnic groups and birth cohorts
6A birth cohort includes all of the sampled women who were born in the same year.
8gives
DD = [E(Y1i|H) − E(Y0i|H)] − [E(Y1i|M)] − E(Y0i|M)], (1)
where Y1 and Y0 denote the second birth dummy for the post-treatment cohort and the pre-
treatment cohort, respectively, and H and M denote the Han and the minorities, respectively.
Intuitively, we compare fertility, or the probability of having a second child, between the
Han Chinese and ethnic minorities before and after the policy came into eﬀect. Comparing
fertility before and after the policy for each ethnic group diﬀerences out time-invariant ethnic
factors, and comparing the post-treatment diﬀerence to the pre-treatment diﬀerence will
remove any changes that are not due to the introduction of the one-child policy. Thus, we
can capture the causal eﬀect of the one-child policy as long as the treatment group did not
experience other changes that are systematically diﬀerent from those experienced by the
control group. As has been argued, to allow the eﬀect to diﬀer across ages, we conduct the
comparison for each birth cohort that falls within the post-treatment period. Note that we
use the second birth dummy, rather than the total number of children, as our measure of
fertility, because a third child is generally not allowed for either the minorities or the Han.
In practice, we use the following regression-adjusted DD model to identify the eﬀect of
the one-child policy on fertility. Consider
Yi = β0 + β1Hi + β2Ti + β3HiTi + Xiβ4 + i, (2)
where Hi is the Han dummy, which equals 1 for a Han woman, and Ti is the policy timing
dummy that equals 1 if a woman is in a post-treatment cohort.7 The two variables, Hi
and Ti, pick up the two main eﬀects of being Han on fertility and of the policy treatment
on fertility. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term, or β3, is essentially our DD estimator.
Assuming that without the one-child policy the changes in the fertility of Han women and
minority women would have been the same between 1979 and 1990,8 the interaction term
picks up the eﬀect of the one-child policy on fertility. In other words, the interaction term
7More strictly, minority women were not subject to the one-child policy, although Ti is deﬁned in the
same way.
8This is the same as assuming that β3 is zero without the one-child policy.
9measures the fertility gap between Han (the treatment group) and ethnic minority (the
control group) women that is attributable to the aﬃrmative one-child policy. We expect a
negative coeﬃcient of the interaction term, which means that the birth control policy has
lowered the fertility of the Han Chinese compared to the fertility of the ethnic minorities.
Note that we add a vector of variables Xi in the equation to control for some demographic
and geographic characteristics that may also be correlated with fertility. Controlling for Xi
changes the estimate of β3 only if HiTi and Xi are correlated, conditional on the two main
eﬀects of being Han and the one-child policy. In this paper we carry out both regressions
(with and without Xi) to test the robustness of our results.
4 Data
We use the 1% sample of the 1982 and 1990 Chinese Population Censuses that were collected
by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (formerly the State Statistic Bureau). They
were the third and fourth censuses of their kind, following the two that were conducted
in 1953 and 1964.9 The 1% sample covers 2,426,908 households in 1982 and 2,832,103
households in 1990. The dataset contains a record for each household, and includes variables
that describe the location, type, and composition of the households. Each household record
is followed by a record for each individual residing in the household. Variables that relate
to individuals include demographic characteristics, occupation, industry, education levels,
ethnicity, marital status, and fertility.
To facilitate our analysis, we use a sub-sample of the census data. We ﬁrst restrict the
sample to women who are either the head of the household or the spouse of the household
head, because for them the census has complete information on fertility, marital status, and
own and spousal education levels. We then restrict the sample to women whose ages were
between 20 and 64 in the census years. We use 20 as the lower bound because it is the
9The two earlier censuses are not available to researchers, but even if they were available they would be
too early for our purposes. The latest census, or the ﬁfth round, was conducted in 2000, and is too late
for the application of the DD method, as almost all of the women in the 2000 census who reported fertility
(1951-1985 cohorts) fall within the post-treatment period, as deﬁned in Section 5.1.
10legal age of marriage for women in China,10 and births to women below the age of 20 are
rare. We set 64 as the upper bound, because the census does not ask women who are older
than this for fertility information. With these restrictions, we obtain a sample of 1,786,888
women from the 1982 census and 2,358,417 women from the 1990 census. Of these women,
94 and 93 percent are Han Chinese in the two years, respectively. We summarize the major
variables for both censuses in Table 1.
Several aspects in Table 1 are worth noting. The table shows that the average number
of children per woman is far greater than one, despite the fact that the one-child policy had
been in force for ten years by the time of the census in 1990. On average, a woman who
was sampled from the 1982 census had 3.8 children. A woman in 1990 had fewer children,
with the number decreasing to 2.9. This also reﬂects the second interesting aspect that
the average birth rate was lower in 1990 than in 1982. Although the proportion of women
who bore at least one child increased slightly during the eight-year period, the proportion
of women who had a second and third child were both lower in 1990, which suggests that
the birth control policy may have played a role in reducing fertility, because more of the
women in the 1990 sample were aﬀected by the policy and for a longer duration than those
in the 1982 sample. For the 1990 census, we are also able to observe whether a woman
resided in a rural or urban residence.11 Moreover, as is evident from the rural and urban
subsamples from the 1990 census, the rural-urban gap in the number of children is as large
as 0.88. Finally, the average education level increased between the two census years. Table
1 shows the four education groups that are deﬁned in this paper: illiterate, primary school,
junior high school, and higher education (senior high school and above).12 The proportion
10The Marriage Law of 1980 (see Peng, 1996), which is still in eﬀect, sets the minimum age of marriage
at 20 for women and 22 for men.
11There was a survey question about whether the interviewee had an rural or urban hukou, or household
registration in the 1990 census. This helps us to distinguish between the rural and urban households.
Unfortunately, this question was not asked in the 1982 census.
12The census coded the education level into seven categories: Illiterate, Primary School, Junior High
School, Senior High School, Technical School, Junior College, and University. As the sample size for senior
high school or above is relatively small, we group all these observations together as the top education level
(higher education).
11of illiterate women dropped sharply from 57 percent to 33 percent, whereas the proportion
of women in all of the other education groups rose.
To gain a picture of how the Han Chinese diﬀer from the ethnic minorities across years,
we divide the sample into Han and minority subgroups in Table 2 and check some of the
variables by age group. A preliminary examination of the data shows signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the two ethnic groups that are consistent between 1982 and 1990. First of all,
minority women had a higher fertility than Han women, regardless of whether we measure
fertility by the number of children per woman or by the proportion of women who had a
second child.13 Second, ethnic minorities had an inferior education attainment on average,
with a much larger proportion of illiterate women. Finally, according to the 1990 census,
minorities were more likely to live in rural areas, with 85 percent of the minorities versus
only 79 percent of the Han being from rural areas. It should be mentioned that all of the
diﬀerences between the Han and the minorities in Table 2 are statistically signiﬁcant at the
one-percent level (the t-ratios are thus not reported). This indicates that there may be some
intrinsic diﬀerences between the Han and the minorities, which validates the use of the DD
strategy to diﬀerence out these factors.
5 The Eﬀect of the One-Child Policy on Fertility
In this section, we systematically test whether China’s birth control policy has had an eﬀect
on fertility, and measure the magnitude of this eﬀect if it is found to exist. We ﬁrst explore the
data and identify the pre-treatment birth cohorts. We then estimate Equation (2) without
and with controlling for Xi, which is the vector of the demographic and geographic variables.
Finally, we examine whether the eﬀect of the one-child policy is diﬀerent in rural versus urban
areas and for women with diﬀerent levels of education. For all of the estimations, we employ
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with a dependent variable that is equal to 1 if
13The only exception is the over-35 group in 1982.
12a household has a second child, and 0 otherwise.14 We leave the robustness checks that
examine the validity of the identiﬁcation assumption of the DD method to Section 6.
5.1 The Pre-Treatment Group
To implement the DD method, we need to identify the pre-treatment group, or the group of
women whose second birth behavior was not aﬀected by the implementation of the one-child
policy. This group includes those women who, by 1979, already had their second child if
they wanted and were able to do so. Of course, they should be the older women, but we
need to determine the cutoﬀ age for the pre-treatment group.
We can identify the cutoﬀ age by looking at the 1982 and 1990 censuses. Figure 1
plots the probability of having a second child by birth cohort for the 1982 census. The graph
shows that the probability of having a second child increases with the year of birth for the
birth cohorts of 1918-1935. This increase in fertility probably reﬂects the better nutrition,
health, and living conditions.15 The probability of having a second child becomes more or
less stable at the level of 96-97 percent for the 1935-1945 cohorts, which means that in 1982,
women in the age range of 37-47 (the 1935-1945 cohorts) had a roughly equal chance of
having a second child. According to studies in the literature of medicine and demography
(Cheng et al., 1992; Tu et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2005), the primary infertility rate for Chinese
couples, or the proportion of couples who are not able to get pregnant when they have been
trying for a certain time, was about 1.3-2 percent in the 1980s. Presumably, the secondary
infertility rate should be higher, which suggests that 96-97 percent is almost the biological
limit for the percentage of Chinese women having a second child. Therefore, women in the
cohorts of 1945 or earlier were almost unaﬀected by the one-child policy.
To check whether the probability of having a second child for the 1945 and earlier
cohorts really stabilized after 1982, we add a line for the 1990 census in Figure 2. If some of
14Using the probit model generates very similar results, but as most of our analysis involves comparing
the means between groups, using the linear (OLS) model is more convenient.
15China was politically instable and was involved in various wars between 1918 and 1945, which may have
aﬀected fertility negatively.
13the women in these cohorts had a second child after 1982, then we should be able to see this
by comparing the 1982 and 1990 lines. Interestingly, Figure 2 conﬁrms that the probability
of having a second child for the 1950 and earlier cohorts indeed stabilized after 1982. The
1982 and 1990 lines almost coincide with each other for the 1950 and earlier cohorts, which
suggests that the probability of having a second child for these cohorts did not change over
the eight-year period.
In Figures 3 and 4, we re-plot the probability of a second birth for the Han and minority
subsamples, respectively. Consistent with Figure 2, the two ﬁgures show that there is almost
no change for the 1950 and earlier cohorts in both the Han and the minority subsamples.
Again, for the 1935-1945 cohorts, the probability reaches 97 percent for the Han subsample
(Figure 3), which is almost the biological limit for second births. For the minorities (Figure
4), the probability is about one percent lower than that of the Han for the 1950 and earlier
cohorts,16 but the probability is also stabilized for these cohorts.
Putting these together, we ﬁnd the following. Chinese women had already had their
second child if they wanted to by the age of 37 (which corresponds to the 1945 cohort in
the 1982 census), as 1945 is the cutoﬀ cohort for stabilized probability across cohorts (1935-
1945), 1950 is the cutoﬀ cohort for stabilized probability across age (the probability does
not change with an increase of age by eight from 1982 to 1990), and women in the 1945 and
earlier cohorts had a rate of second births that reached the biological limit.
Our goal is to identify women in these birth cohorts who had had a second child by
1979 (if they were able and willing), the year in which the one-child policy started. As
we do not have data from 1979, we make use of what we have learned from the 1982 and
1990 censuses to pin down those birth cohorts. We learned that in 1982, women who were
37 or older had already had their second child. As the earlier cohorts generally did their
childbearing earlier in their lifecycle than the later cohorts, it is safe to assume that in 1979,
women who were aged 37 or above had already had their second child if they wanted and
16Liu et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the infertility rate for minorities is a little higher than that of the Han.
14were able to. The cutoﬀ age of 37 in 1979 means that the cutoﬀ birth cohort is 1942. Thus,
we use the 1942 and earlier cohorts as the pre-treatment group in our DD analysis.
5.2 The Eﬀect of the One-Child Policy
We begin by examining the eﬀect of the one-child policy on fertility using the 1982 census,
and report the results in Table 3. Before examining the DD estimates, we ﬁrst present the
results for the diﬀerence between the Han and the minorities in having a second child for the
pre-treatment (1918-1942) and post-treatment groups (1943-1967) as a whole. As is shown in
column 4, row 1, the average diﬀerence in the probability of having a second child between
the Han and the minorities for the pre-treatment cohorts is 1.4 percentage points. The
number is signiﬁcantly positive, which means that for the group before the policy treatment,
Han women were more likely to have a second child than minority women. However, the
average diﬀerence for the post-treatment cohorts as a whole is reversed to -6.1 percentage
points, which indicates that the minorities were more likely to have a second child in the
post-treatment period.
To see more clearly how the diﬀerence between the Han and the minorities evolves
across cohorts, we plot the diﬀerence for each birth cohort in Figure 5. We also report the
diﬀerence for each of the post-treatment cohorts in column 4 of Table 3.17 Note that the
diﬀerence is slightly above zero for the 1947 and earlier cohorts, and that the magnitude is
almost the same within the whole range, which implies that our choice of the pre-treatment
group (the 1942 or earlier cohorts) is safe. The diﬀerence remains positive, although rather
small in magnitude, for the 1943-1947 cohorts, and then turns negative for the 1948 and
later cohorts. The sharp change that starts with the 1948 cohort suggests that the one-child
policy has reversed and increased the fertility gap between the Han Chinese and the ethnic
minorities. The gap (the absolute value) reaches the maximum of 22 percentage points with
the 1958 cohort (24 years old in 1982) and then starts to decrease for the later cohorts.
17To save space, we do not report the diﬀerence for each pre-treatment cohort (1942 and earlier cohorts),
as it is not in the interest of this paper. The complete results are available upon request.
15The eﬀect of the one-child policy is smaller for both earlier and later cohorts within
the post-treatment group, but for diﬀerent reasons. In the earlier cohorts, some Han women
had already had their second child by 1979, and hence were not aﬀected by the one-child
policy. In the later cohorts, although Han women were more likely to be aﬀected by the
policy, some minority women who wanted to have a second child may not have done so by
the census year. Thus, the eﬀect of the policy for younger women is expected to increase
with time, and for these two reasons the one-child policy appears to have had the greatest
eﬀect on the cohorts near 1958, the women in which were about 24 years old in 1982 (21 in
1979).
The DD estimates (the estimated β3) that are reported in column 5 of Table 3 give more
details of the eﬀect of the one-child policy for each birth cohort. Although the eﬀect for the
1943-1947 cohorts is mixed, the DD estimates for the 1948-1962 cohorts are all negative and
signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The women in these aﬀected cohorts were 17-31 years old
in 1979 when the policy was implemented. The magnitude of the eﬀect ﬁrst increases with
the birth year, peaks at 23.4 percent for the 1958 cohort, and then descends thereafter.18
The average eﬀect on the post-treatment group is reported in the last two rows. On average,
the one-child policy has lowered a Han woman’s probability of having a second child by 7.5
percentage points, compared to the probability for a minority woman before and after the
policy treatment. If we focus on the relatively early post-treatment cohorts (1945-1959),
whose second birth behavior is more likely to have been fully observed, the eﬀect of the
one-child policy rises to 9.0 percentage points.
To check how stable the one-child policy eﬀect is, in Figure 6 we add another line for
the 1990 census for comparison. The 1990 line shows that the diﬀerence between the Han
and the minorities remains quite stable until 1958, after which the gap between the two
census years starts to expand. Note that the 1990 line for the 1958 and earlier cohorts is
18As we use the same pre-treatment group to identify the policy eﬀect for each post-treatment cohort, the
diﬀerence between the results in column 4 and column 5 is simply a constant, that is, the average diﬀerence
for the pre-treatment cohorts. However, the signiﬁcance levels are not necessarily the same.
16very close to that of the 1982 line, which suggests that the DD estimates for the 1943-1958
cohorts are very similar for the two census years. In contrast, for the cohorts after 1958,
the diﬀerence between the two census years steadily increases with the birth year. As has
been discussed, one reason is that compared to the earlier cohorts, a larger proportion of the
women in the later cohorts had not had their second child (if they wanted to) by 1982. In
other words, more of their second birth behavior had been observed by 1990.
The estimation results for the 1990 census are reported in Table 4. As is shown in
column 5, the DD estimates are signiﬁcantly negative for almost all of the post-treatment
cohorts. Similar to the results for the 1982 census, the magnitude ﬁrst increases with the
birth year, reaches the maximum level of 21.9 percent at the 1959 cohort, and then decreases.
Note that the DD estimates for most of the cohorts in the post-treatment group for the 1990
census are larger than those for the 1982 census, and the average magnitude of the treatment
eﬀect is as large as 11.0 percentage points. The eight-year diﬀerence (comparing the last
row of Table 3 to that of Table 4) in the eﬀect of the one-child policy for cohorts 1945-1959
is 2.5 percentage points.
In summary, we ﬁnd that the one-child policy has had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on reducing
the fertility of Han Chinese relative to ethnic minorities. In both rounds of the census, the
DD estimate for each of the cohorts between 1948 and 1962, the women in which were aged
between 17 and 31 when the policy was introduced in 1979, is statistically signiﬁcant.19 The
average eﬀect on the post-treatment cohorts is -7.5 and -11.0 percentage points for 1982 and
1990, respectively. We also ﬁnd that the eﬀect diﬀers across birth cohorts. Speciﬁcally, the
magnitude is the largest for the 1958-1959 cohorts (at levels of about 20 percentage points),
and is smaller for both the earlier and later post-treatment cohorts. The pattern across
cohorts is very similar between the two census years.
In the following detailed analysis and robustness check, we focus on the 1990 census
19The 1982 sample excludes the 1963-1970 cohorts, the women in which were too young to have a suﬃ-
ciently complete childbearing record in 1982. The DD coeﬃcients for these cohorts are also signiﬁcant in
the 1990 sample.
17unless otherwise stated. The estimations using the 1982 census (if applicable) generate
similar results and are thus omitted. Due to space limitations, we only report the DD
estimates in tables.
5.3 Estimates with Control Variables
In this subsection, we estimate Equation (2) using the household and geographic variables
as control variables.20 Adding these variables does not only control for other policies or
social-economic conditions that may aﬀect fertility, but also tests the robustness of our DD
estimates. If the DD estimator has picked up the eﬀect of cross-cohort changes in other
diﬀerences between the Han and the minorities, then controlling for these variables will
reduce the magnitude of the estimator. However, if the one-child policy is uncorrelated
with these variables, then our DD estimates should undergo no signiﬁcant change even after
controlling for these variables.
In general, the census provides very few variables, and we try to use all that are
relevant. In particular, we use the education dummies as deﬁned in Section 4 to capture the
opportunity cost of children and the preference of women,21 and use the provincial and rural
dummies to capture geographic factors that may inﬂuence parental preferences and the costs
of children.
Interestingly, the DD estimations are not very sensitive to the inclusion of these vari-
ables. The second and third columns of Table 5 report the DD estimates from the regressions
that control for the education level of women and their husbands. Compared to column 1,
which has no other control variables, the magnitudes of the DD estimates only decrease
marginally, and by less than one percentage point for most of the cohorts. When we also
include the provincial and rural dummies in column 4, the magnitudes of the DD estimates
even increase slightly, although they are still smaller compared to those in column 1. The
20See Behrman and Wolfe (1984) and Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) for the potential determinants of
fertility.
21It is well known that fertility is negatively correlated with a woman’s education (see, for example, Jain,
1981; Wang, 1988; Martin, 1995).
18trend is the same for the average eﬀect, as is shown in the last two rows. Overall, controlling
for these covariates causes very small changes in the DD estimates, which suggests that our
method may to a large extent have picked up the eﬀect of the one-child policy on fertility.
5.4 The Eﬀect of the One-Child Policy in Rural and Urban Areas
The eﬀect of the one-child policy on fertility is signiﬁcant in the whole sample, but we do not
know whether the eﬀect diﬀers between rural and urban areas. Previous empirical studies
have found that the one-child policy is more strict in urban areas than in rural areas (Zhang
and Spencer, 1992; Ahn, 1994). The one-child policy may be less eﬀective in rural areas for
various reasons. First, in rural China, parents have a stronger desire to have more than one
child, even at the cost of penalty ﬁnes for violating the birth control policy.22 In addition
to the consumption value of children, they are also very important investments for parents
because they can carry out farm and house work, and in particular provide parents with
security in their old age.23 Sons are especially preferred in rural China, because they provide
major support and care for aging parents, continue the family name, carry out heavy farm
work, and receive the family inheritance (Dasgupta, 1995; Graham et al., 1998). Most cases
of above-quota births in rural areas arise because households want a son (Zhang, 1994).
However, in urban China, a child’s value is lower and its cost is higher relative to the cost
in rural areas (Croll, 1983), thanks to a better social security system and the soaring cost of
nurturing a child. In addition, the preference for sons is less prevalent in urban areas, which
gives parents less of an incentive to have a second child even if the ﬁrst child is a girl. The
second reason, as discussed in Section 2, is that the one-child policy may have been enforced
more strictly in urban areas.
To allow for the disparity in the eﬀect of the policy between rural and urban areas, we
perform the same estimations using the rural and urban subsamples. Figures 7-9 conﬁrm
22Above-quota births in rural areas are very common. Using a sample of 14,808 infants in rural Hebei, Li
(1995) ﬁnds that 52 percent were above-quota births.
23See Becker (1991), Johnson (1994), Dasgupta (1995), and Ray (1998) for arguments on the beneﬁts of
children in developing countries.
19the prediction that the eﬀect of the policy has been smaller in rural China than in urban
China. Note ﬁrst that the probability of having a second child is higher in rural areas for
both Han and minority women and for each post-treatment cohort as expected (Figures 7
and 8). Figure 9 plots the fertility gap between Han and minority women by birth cohort
for the rural and urban subsamples. As is shown by both lines, the fertility gap is more or
less stable for the pre-treatment cohorts (1942 or earlier), but starts to widen at the 1945
cohort. The change in the urban line is much steeper than the change in the rural line, which
implies that the eﬀect of the treatment is larger for the urban Han.
The DD estimates that are reported in Table 6 give the details of the eﬀect for each
post-treatment cohort. The eﬀects for most of the cohorts (1948-1970) are negative and
statistically signiﬁcant for both rural and urban areas. The rural-urban diﬀerence in the
treatment eﬀect is sizable. On average, the one-child policy has reduced a rural Han woman’s
probability of having a second child by 7.5 percentage points (column 1), compared to a
16.8 percentage-point (column 2) drop for a Han woman living in an urban area. The
eﬀect in urban areas reaches the maximum of 35.3 percentage points (1958 cohort), whereas
the maximum eﬀect for rural areas is only 15.6 percentage points (cohort 1965). Our DD
estimates of the eﬀect of the one-child policy are consistent with previous ﬁndings that there
is a large discrepancy between rural and urban areas. In particular, the one-child policy has
been more eﬀective in deterring Han Chinese women in urban areas from having a second
child than it has been from deterring Han Chinese women from rural areas.
5.5 Eﬀect of the One-Child Policy by Education Level
Another issue that we address in this study is whether the eﬀect of the policy varies with the
education level of the women. There are reasons to believe that a woman’s education may
interact with the one-child policy in reducing fertility. Women with a higher educational
level may better understand the policy, and would thus be more willing to abide by it.
Women with more education may also have better knowledge of the eﬀective contraceptive
20methods, and thus engage in better birth control. More importantly, better-educated women
may suﬀer a higher cost for violating the birth control policy, because higher education is
usually associated with a better occupation, a higher income, and a more respectable social
status. As argued by Li and Zhang (2004), a large ﬁne on above-quota birth can deter
rich households from having children, but may fail to deter poor households. Although
the mechanisms through which education interacts with the one-child policy are not well
documented, a few studies have found that better-educated women are more likely to comply
with the one-child policy (Wang, 1989; Zhang and Spencer, 1992; Ahn, 1994).
Again, to test the variation of the treatment eﬀect that is associated with education,
we carry out the same DD analysis for the four education groups: illiterate, primary school,
junior high school, and higher education (senior high school and above). The estimation
results are reported in Table 7 and plotted in Figures 10-12.
Figures 10 and 11 clearly show that the probability of having a second child decreases
with the educational attainment of women for all of the birth cohorts, and for both the
Han and the minorities. The average probability of a Han woman having a second child for
the post-treatment cohorts falls from 75.9 percent in the illiterate subsample to a mere 17.9
percent in the higher education subsample. The pattern for minority women is similar, with
the average probability dropping from 61.5 to 28.2 percent.
Our DD analysis indicates that the one-child policy indeed has a larger eﬀect for women
with a higher level of education. Figure 12 shows that the diﬀerence between the Han and
minority women increases with education. Of the four lines, the line for the illiterate group
is on top and is the ﬂattest. The slope of the lines increases with education, and the line
for the higher education group is at the bottom and is the steepest. The DD estimates that
are reported in Table 7 give the details of how the eﬀect of the one-child policy increases
with education. The policy appears to have a marginal impact on the least-educated group,
with the average eﬀect on the post-treatment cohorts (1943-1970) being just slightly below
zero for the illiterate group (-0.8 percentage points, column 1). However, for women with
21a better education, the policy has been more eﬀective in lowering fertility. As is shown in
columns 2-4, the average eﬀect is -4.4 percentage points for the primary school group, -12.6
points for the junior high school group, and -15.5 points for the higher education group. At
least for these cohorts, improvements in education make Han women more likely to comply
with the one-child policy.24 Interestingly, the peak of the treatment eﬀect still occurs at the
1958-1959 cohorts in all of the subsamples.
5.6 Eﬀect by Education Level and Area
Considering the rural-urban discrepancy that we discussed earlier in this section, it is possible
that the role of education may depend on the place of residence. In particular, the variation
in complying with the one-child policy among education groups may be smaller in urban
areas, as the policy is implemented more strictly there, which means that there is little
diﬀerence in the punishments for less educated women and for more educated women. We
try to tackle this issue by examining the eﬀect of the birth control policy by education group
for the rural and urban subsamples. The results for the rural subsample are presented in
Table 8 and Figure 13,25 and the results for the urban subsample are reported in Table 9
and Figure 14.
Education plays a signiﬁcant role in changing the treatment eﬀect of the birth control
policy in rural areas. Figure 13 looks similar to Figure 12, although the gaps between the
diﬀerent education groups are smaller. As shown in Table 8, the average treatment eﬀect
for the 1943-1970 cohorts is -0.9 percentage points for the illiterate group, -4.0 points for the
primary school group, and -11.3 points for the junior high school and above group, a pattern
that is consistent with that in the previous subsection. This implies that in rural China, the
eﬀect of the birth control policy also diﬀers according to a woman’s education attainment, but
both the magnitude per se and the variation that is generated by the education attainment
24Our ﬁnding is consistent with that of Zhang and Spencer (1992), who, using micro-level data, show that
the probability of signing the one-child certiﬁcate (complying with the policy) increases with education.
25As the observations of women with a higher education level are rare (less than 4 percent) in the rural
subsample, only three education levels are deﬁned: illiterate, primary school, and junior high school and
above.
22is not as large as it is for the whole sample. This ﬁnding suggests that much of the diﬀerence
across education groups is in fact the diﬀerence between the rural and urban areas.
The role of education becomes weaker in urban areas. The four lines in Figure 14 are
very close to each other for the post-treatment cohorts, which suggests that the diﬀerence in
policy eﬀect across education groups is smaller. The average treatment eﬀect, as reported in
Table 9, is -2.3 percentage points for the illiterate group, -10.5 points for the primary school
group, -16.3 points for the junior high school group, and -15.4 points for the higher education
group. Although the magnitude increases with education across the lower three groups, the
top education group (column 4) appears to have a smaller eﬀect compared to the junior high
school group (column 3), but if we focus on the relatively earlier cohorts (1945-1959), the
eﬀect of the one-child policy again shows a clear increasing trend with education.
6 Robustness Check
In this section, we test the robustness of our main estimates of the eﬀect of the one-child
policy on fertility. The key assumption of the DD method is that without the one-child
policy, the changes in the fertility of the Han and the minorities would have been the same
between 1979 and 1990. One may be concerned with the extent to which this assumption
holds. If there are other policy shocks or changes in social-economic variables in the same
period that have aﬀected the fertility behavior of the Han and the minorities diﬀerently,
then the DD method may have picked up these eﬀects. A priori, we do not know of any
such shocks or variables that are diﬀerent by design for the Han and the minorities, but we
can test the validity of our key assumption by conducting some robustness checks.
One way to test the robustness of the DD estimates is to directly examine whether other
household decision variables, which may reﬂect parental preference and the opportunity costs
of children but are not likely to be aﬀected by the one-child policy, have changed diﬀerently
for the Han and the minorities during the treatment period. If there are other policies
or changes in social-economic variables that have altered the preference and opportunity
23costs of children of the Han Chinese more than the minorities in the post-treatment cohorts,
then the DD estimator should pick up these eﬀects when using these alternative household
decision variables as dependent variables in Equation (2). To make our DD estimator of
second birth behavior valid, we need to make sure that the estimates for these alternative
dependent variables are not very large.
To this end, we use the dummies for having a ﬁrst child and getting married as alterna-
tive dependent variables. To a large extent, having a ﬁrst child and getting married should
not have been directly aﬀected by the one-child policy, at least for the birth cohorts who had
already got married or had their ﬁrst child by the time the policy came into force. For the
very late cohorts, there may be a feedback eﬀect, in that those who knew that they could
not have a second child may have married late or had their ﬁrst child late. This feedback
eﬀect means that, even without other policy shocks or changes in social-economic variables,
there may still be a DD eﬀect for marriage and ﬁrst child behavior. Given this potential
feedback eﬀect, which tends to increase the estimates, if our estimates of these alternative
dependent variables are still small, then we should be conﬁdent that our DD estimator is not
picking up the eﬀect of other policy shocks or changes in social-economic variables. However,
if the estimates are large, especially for the earlier post-treatment cohorts, then we should
be concerned that our estimator is picking up other eﬀects.
The regression results that are reported in Table 10 seem to suggest that our estimates
of the eﬀect of the one-child policy may not be mainly driven by other factors. As most
women in our restricted sample (household head or spouse of household head) are married,
we expand the sample to include all women between the ages of 20 and 64 for the marriage
equation. For the probability of having a ﬁrst child or being married, the estimates are very
small for most of the 1943-1970 cohorts, and the signs of the estimates vary across cohorts.
The average eﬀects over 1943-1970 are even positive (0.001 in the case of having a ﬁrst
child and 0.007 in the case of being married). These estimates suggest that for most of the
cohorts for which a large eﬀect of the one-child policy on the probability of having a second
24child has been identiﬁed, there is almost no cross-cohort change in the gap between the Han
and the minorities in the probability of getting married or having a ﬁrst child. That the
negative eﬀects on having a ﬁrst child and being married are signiﬁcant for only the very
late cohorts (1964-1970 for having a ﬁrst child and 1967-1970 for getting married) suggests
that the minorities are more likely to get married and have a ﬁrst child than the Han, but
only among very young women.
The same implications can be drawn from Figures 15 and 16. In Figure 15, we plot the
diﬀerence between the Han and the minorities in having a ﬁrst child for both the 1982 and
1990 censuses. Note that the two lines look almost the same, except that the 1990 line is a
shift of the 1982 line to the right by exactly eight years. The two lines for the diﬀerences in
being married in Figure 16 also exhibit the same pattern, except that the shift is about 10
years. These ﬁgures suggest little change in the diﬀerence in getting married or having a ﬁrst
child across cohorts, meaning that there is almost no detectable change in the preference of
women or the opportunity cost of children, especially among women who were most aﬀected
by the one-child policy.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we measure the eﬀect of China’s one-child policy on fertility. China’s aﬃrma-
tive birth control policy provides us with a natural experiment that allows us to identify the
eﬀect on fertility that resulted from the enactment of the policy. Such natural experiments
are rare, whether for the analysis of eﬀects on fertility, or for economic analysis in general.
Employing two rounds of the Chinese Population Census, we ﬁnd that the one-child
policy has had a large eﬀect on fertility. The average eﬀect on the post-treatment cohorts
(1943-1970) is as large as -11.0 percentage points in 1990. We also ﬁnd that the magnitude
of the eﬀect is not uniform across the population. The one-child policy has had almost no
eﬀect on fertility for the rural illiterate group, but has been as large as -30 percentage points
for some urban cohorts with a higher education. Our robustness tests suggest that our DD
25estimates of the eﬀect of the one-child policy are not mainly driven by other factors, such
as other policies or economic shocks that have changed the fertility preference and costs of
children diﬀerently for the Han and the minorities.
Ever since its inception in the late 1970s, China’s one-child policy has been contro-
versial, and has drawn attention from politicians, the mass media, and academics. More
importantly, the policy aﬀects the lives of more than one billion people, which makes mea-
suring its eﬀect very important in its own right. Even if we ignore the other positive and
negative aspects of forced birth control policies, the one-child policy still has a mixed eﬀect
on economic development. On the one hand, as is shown by Li and Zhang (2005), the popu-
lation reduction as a result of the dramatic population control policy has indeed helped the
growth of the Chinese economy since the late 1970s. On the other hand, as is found in this
paper, the imposition of the one-child policy may perpetuate or even exacerbate inequality.
Does China still need the one-child policy after 26 years of implementation? What are the
eﬀects of the policy on many important aspects of China and the Chinese economy, such as
the sex ratio, the family structure, the marriage market, old-age support, labor supply, and
child quality? To answer these questions and to better understand the eﬀect of the one-child
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Figure 2: Probability of Having a Second Child
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Figure 4: Probability of Having a Second Child
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Figure 6: Han-Minority Difference by Birth Cohort 
 
























1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Birth Cohort
Rural Urban
Han Sample for the 1990 Census























1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Birth Cohort
Rural Urban
Minority Sample for the 1990 Census



































1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Birth Cohort
Rural Urban
Probability of Having a Second Child for the 1990 Census
Figure 9: Han-Minority Difference by Birth Cohort
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Figure 12: Han-Minority Difference by Birth Cohort
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Figure 14: Han-Minority Difference by Birth Cohort
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 Mean (S.D.) 
         
Observations 1,786,888  2,358,417    1,862,914  495,503 
         
Age  39.49 (11.21)  39.23 (11.31)    38.87 (11.34)  40.58 (11.08) 
         
Han  0.94 (0.24)  0.93 (0.26)    0.92 (0.27)  0.95 (0.22) 
         
Rural -  0.79  (0.41)    -  - 
         
Fertility         
         
Number of children born  3.83 (2.42)  2.89 (1.91)    3.07 (1.93)  2.19 (1.63) 
         
Having a first child  0.96 (0.20)  0.97 (0.18)    0.97 (0.18)  0.95 (0.21) 
         
Having a second child  0.83 (0.37)  0.75 (0.44)    0.80 (0.40)  0.54 (0.50) 
         
Having a third child  0.66 (0.47)  0.49 (0.50)    0.53 (0.50)  0.33 (0.47) 
         
Education         
         
Illiterate  0.57 (0.49)  0.33 (0.47)    0.39 (0.49)  0.12 (0.33) 
         
Primary school  0.28 (0.45)  0.37 (0.48)    0.41 (0.49)  0.21 (0.41) 
         
Junior high school  0.11 (0.31)  0.21 (0.41)    0.17 (0.38)  0.35 (0.48) 
         
Higher education  
(Senior high school and above) 
0.04 (0.20)  0.09 (0.29)    0.03 (0.18)  0.32 (0.47) 
         
 
Note: All sampled women are household head or spouse of the head, with age between 20 and 64 at the census 
years. Rural indicator is not available for the 1982 census.   38
 






















         
Observations  1,679,571 107,317    2,190,115 168,302 
         
Number of children born         
         
Age 20-24  1.00 (0.79)   1.33 (1.03)    1.02 (0.73)  1.20 (0.88) 
         
Age 25-29  1.81 (1.00)  2.36  (1.37)    1.56 (0.83)  1.89 (1.05) 
         
Age 30-34  2.79 (1.22)  3.57 (1.69)    1.96 (0.97)  2.63 (1.35) 
         
Age 35-64  4.94 (2.30)  5.55 (2.67)    3.63 (1.89)  4.42 (2.27) 
         
Having a second child         
         
Age 20-24  0.22 (0.42)  0.38 (0.49)    0.21 (0.41)  0.32 (0.47) 
         
Age 25-29  0.58 (0.49)  0.72 (0.45)    0.47 (0.50)  0.62 (0.49) 
         
Age 30-34  0.88 (0.32)  0.91 (0.28)    0.64 (0.48)  0.83 (0.38) 
         
Age 35-64  0.95 (0.22)  0.94 (0.24)    0.90 (0.30)  0.94 (0.24) 
         
Education         
         
Illiterate  0.57 (0.50)  0.65 (0.48)    0.32 (0.47)  0.44 (0.50) 
         
Primary school  0.28 (0.45)  0.24 (0.42)    0.37 (0.48)  0.34 (0.47) 
         
Junior high school  0.11 (0.31)  0.08 (0.28)    0.21 (0.41)  0.16 (0.36) 
         
Higher education  
(Senior high school and above) 
0.04 (0.20)  0.03 (0.18)    0.10 (0.29)  0.07 (0.26) 
         
Rural  -  -    0.79 (0.41)  0.85 (0.35) 
         
 
Note: All sampled women are household head or spouse of the head, with age between 20 and 64 at the census 
years. Rural indicator is not available for the 1982 census.  All the differences between Han and minorities are 
significant at the 1 percent level, thus t-ratios are omitted.    39
 
Table 3: Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of the One-Child Policy on the Probability of 
Having a Second Child: 1982 Census 
    


























              
              
Pre-Treatment 
(N=820,499) 
    
 
    
              
1918 - 1942  64-40  0.946  0.932  0.014  (13.06)***  -  - 
              
              
Post-Treatment  
(N=966,389) 
    
 
    
              
1943 39  0.969  0.962  0.006  (1.88)*  -0.008  (-1.69)* 
1944 38  0.970  0.946  0.024  (7.28)***  0.010  (2.27)** 
1945 37  0.965  0.956  0.009  (2.59)***  -0.005  (-1.13) 
1946 36  0.959  0.955  0.004  (1.01)  -0.010  (-2.33)** 
1947 35  0.954  0.947  0.007  (1.99)**  -0.007  (-1.56) 
1948 34  0.942  0.943  -0.001  (-0.25)  -0.015  (-3.48)*** 
1949 33  0.924  0.933  -0.009  (-1.91)*  -0.023  (-5.38)*** 
1950 32  0.894  0.924  -0.029  (-5.74)***  -0.043  (-10.64)*** 
1951 31  0.858  0.900  -0.042  (-6.81)***  -0.056  (-12.79)*** 
1952 30  0.808  0.875  -0.067  (-10.75)***  -0.081  (-19.91)*** 
1953 29  0.741  0.839  -0.098  (-13.70)***  -0.112  (-26.14)*** 
1954 28  0.654  0.780  -0.126  (-16.90)***  -0.140  (-33.23)*** 
1955 27  0.563  0.717  -0.154  (-18.88)***  -0.168  (-37.87)*** 
1956 26  0.465  0.648  -0.182  (-20.60)***  -0.196  (-42.06)*** 
1957 25  0.382  0.590  -0.209  (-24.26)***  -0.223  (-48.63)*** 
1958 24  0.294  0.514  -0.220  (-24.51)***  -0.234  (-47.63)*** 
1959 23  0.227  0.403  -0.176  (-17.13)***  -0.190  (-32.74)*** 
1960 22  0.161  0.325  -0.164  (-15.71)***  -0.177  (-27.39)*** 
1961 21  0.109  0.207  -0.098  (-8.20)***  -0.112  (-13.04)*** 
1962 20  0.069  0.184  -0.115  (-11.89)***  -0.129  (-15.76)*** 
              
1943 - 1962  39-20  0.732  0.793  -0.061  (-32.69)***  -0.075  (-32.98)*** 
              
1945 - 1959  37-23  0.732  0.808  -0.076  (-37.64)***  -0.090  (-38.92)*** 
              
 
Note: t-ratios are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent. N 
represents number of observations.   40
 
Table 4: Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of the One-Child Policy on the Probability of 
Having a Second Child: 1990 Census 
    


























              
Pre-Treatment  
(N=595,542) 
    
 
    
              
1926 ~1942  64~48  0.955  0.945  0.011  (10.02)***  -  - 
              
Post-Treatment  
(N=1,762,875) 
    
 
    
              
1943 47  0.965  0.963  0.002  (0.51)  -0.009  (-2.32)** 
1944 46  0.963  0.954  0.009  (2.79)***  -0.001  (-0.39) 
1945 45  0.961  0.957  0.004  (1.31)  -0.006  (-1.73)* 
1946 44  0.955  0.960  -0.005  (-1.28)  -0.015  (-4.07)*** 
1947 43  0.947  0.953  -0.006  (-1.51)  -0.016  (-4.45)*** 
1948 42  0.934  0.949  -0.015  (-3.82)***  -0.026  (-7.18)*** 
1949 41  0.914  0.946  -0.032  (-7.74)***  -0.043  (-12.49)*** 
1950 40  0.887  0.931  -0.044  (-9.73)***  -0.055  (-16.09)*** 
1951 39  0.859  0.928  -0.069  (-12.62)***  -0.080  (-21.04)*** 
1952 38  0.831  0.920  -0.090  (-17.35)***  -0.101  (-28.79)*** 
1953 37  0.787  0.906  -0.119  (-20.37)***  -0.129  (-35.16)*** 
1954 36  0.750  0.894  -0.143  (-24.68)***  -0.154  (-42.86)*** 
1955 35  0.725  0.883  -0.158  (-26.42)***  -0.169  (-46.65)*** 
1956 34  0.694  0.866  -0.172  (-26.66)***  -0.183  (-48.38)*** 
1957 33  0.669  0.861  -0.192  (-29.92)***  -0.203  (-54.15)*** 
1958 32  0.637  0.834  -0.197  (-29.07)***  -0.208  (-54.64)*** 
1959 31  0.603  0.811  -0.208  (-26.02)***  -0.219  (-51.82)*** 
1960 30  0.565  0.756  -0.191  (-25.00)***  -0.201  (-50.11)*** 
1961 29  0.572  0.738  -0.166  (-18.90)***  -0.177  (-39.45)*** 
1962 28  0.544  0.697  -0.153  (-23.92)***  -0.164  (-44.74)*** 
1963 27  0.475  0.631  -0.156  (-25.53)***  -0.167  (-46.24)*** 
1964 26  0.418  0.570  -0.152  (-23.68)***  -0.163  (-44.72)*** 
1965 25  0.355  0.506  -0.151  (-23.10)***  -0.161  (-43.96)*** 
1966 24  0.293  0.435  -0.143  (-21.11)***  -0.153  (-40.23)*** 
1967 23  0.222  0.350  -0.127  (-17.26)***  -0.138  (-32.97)*** 
1968 22  0.157  0.265  -0.109  (-16.15)***  -0.119  (-28.59)*** 
1969 21  0.111  0.199  -0.088  (-11.57)***  -0.098  (-19.24)*** 
1970 20  0.069  0.143  -0.075  (-9.49)***  -0.085  (-13.60)*** 
             
1943 - 1970  47-20  0.668  0.767  -0.099  (-72.66)***  -0.110  (-44.58)*** 
             
1945 - 1959  45-31  0.799  0.903  -0.104  (-68.01)***  -0.115  (-52.74)*** 
             
 
Note: t-ratios are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent. N 
represents number of observations. 
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Table 5: Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of One-Child Policy on the Probability of Having a 
Second Child: 1990 Census  (With other control variables ) 
  
 DD  Estimates 















Area and Education 
(4) 
               




      
 
    
               
1943  -0.009 (-2.32)**  -0.008 (-2.04)**  -0.008 (-2.06)**  -0.008 (-2.17)** 
1944  -0.001 (-0.39)  -0.001 (-0.25)  -0.001 (-0.22)  -0.001 (-0.35) 
1945  -0.006 (-1.73)*  -0.006 (-1.61)  -0.006 (-1.59)  -0.008 (-2.12)** 
1946  -0.015 (-4.07)***  -0.014 (-3.84)***  -0.014 (-3.85)***  -0.015 (-3.90)*** 
1947  -0.016 (-4.45)***  -0.016 (-4.31)***  -0.016 (-4.25)***  -0.015 (-4.25)*** 
1948  -0.026 (-7.18)***  -0.025 (-7.07)***  -0.025 (-7.05)***  -0.027 (-7.46)*** 
1949  -0.043 (-12.49)***  -0.042 (-12.18)*** -0.042  (-12.14)*** -0.042  (-12.25)*** 
1950  -0.055 (-16.09)***  -0.053 (-15.71)*** -0.053  (-15.62)*** -0.056  (-16.46)*** 
1951  -0.080 (-21.04)***  -0.078 (-20.77)*** -0.078  (-20.73)*** -0.079  (-21.15)*** 
1952  -0.101 (-28.79)***  -0.098 (-28.40)*** -0.098  (-28.23)*** -0.099  (-28.81)*** 
1953  -0.129 (-35.16)***  -0.125 (-34.45)*** -0.125  (-34.30)*** -0.127  (-35.08)*** 
1954  -0.154 (-42.86)***  -0.148 (-41.85)*** -0.148  (-41.69)*** -0.150  (-42.47)*** 
1955  -0.169 (-46.65)***  -0.162 (-45.41)*** -0.162  (-45.24)*** -0.164  (-46.31)*** 
1956  -0.183 (-48.38)***  -0.178 (-47.77)*** -0.177  (-47.68)*** -0.179  (-48.52)*** 
1957  -0.203 (-54.15)***  -0.193 (-52.40)*** -0.192  (-52.36)*** -0.194  (-53.13)*** 
1958  -0.208 (-54.64)***  -0.198 (-52.94)*** -0.197  (-52.71)*** -0.200  (-53.85)*** 
1959  -0.219 (-51.82)***  -0.206 (-49.36)*** -0.205  (-49.36)*** -0.210  (-50.64)*** 
1960  -0.201 (-50.11)***  -0.185 (-46.52)*** -0.184  (-46.29)*** -0.190  (-48.16)*** 
1961  -0.177 (-39.45)***  -0.166 (-37.35)*** -0.165  (-37.21)*** -0.170  (-38.57)*** 
1962  -0.164 (-44.74)***  -0.152 (-42.15)*** -0.152  (-42.05)*** -0.157  (-43.80)*** 
1963  -0.167 (-46.24)***  -0.155 (-43.78)*** -0.154  (-43.52)*** -0.160  (-45.22)*** 
1964  -0.163 (-44.72)***  -0.153 (-42.57)*** -0.153  (-42.35)*** -0.156  (-43.57)*** 
1965  -0.161 (-43.96)***  -0.154 (-42.21)*** -0.153  (-41.98)*** -0.157  (-42.98)*** 
1966  -0.153 (-40.23)***  -0.148 (-39.01)*** -0.147  (-38.82)*** -0.150  (-39.44)*** 
1967  -0.138 (-32.97)***  -0.134 (-32.15)*** -0.134  (-32.04)*** -0.136  (-32.50)*** 
1968  -0.119 (-28.59)***  -0.117 (-28.11)*** -0.117  (-28.05)*** -0.118  (-28.23)*** 
1969  -0.098 (-19.24)***  -0.097 (-19.05)*** -0.097  (-19.03)*** -0.099  (-19.43)*** 
1970  -0.085 (-13.60)***  -0.084 (-13.38)*** -0.084  (-13.34)*** -0.089  (-14.19)*** 
             
1943  -1970  -0.110 (-44.58)***  -0.090 (-39.19)*** -0.088  (-38.52)*** -0.097  (-43.09)*** 
             
1945  -1959  -0.115 (-52.74)***  -0.103 (-50.76)*** -0.101  (-50.32)*** -0.111  (-56.78)*** 
              
N  2,358,417  2,358,417 2,358,417 2,358,417 
              
 
Note: t-ratios are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent. 
Column 1 reports the basic results without controlling for other variables (same as Table 4, column 5). Column 2 
controls for women’s education (dummies indicating levels of illiterate, primary school, junior high school, senior 
high school, technical school, junior college or university). Column 3 controls for both women’s and their husbands’ 
education. Column 4 controls for education as well as provincial and rural indicators.  N represents number of 
observations.   42
 
Table 6: Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of One-Child Policy on the Probability of Having a 
Second Child: 1990 Census (Rural versus urban) 
  
 DD  Estimates 










          
Post-Treatment           
          
1943 -0.005  (-1.24)    -0.021  (-1.80)* 
1944 0.001  (0.38)    -0.003  (-0.26) 
1945 0.0003  (0.08)    -0.023  (-2.05)** 
1946 -0.008  (-2.10)**    -0.026  (-2.15)** 
1947 -0.007  (-1.96)**    -0.018  (-1.57) 
1948 -0.008  (-2.20)**    -0.066  (-5.99)*** 
1949 -0.016  (-4.77)***    -0.096  (-8.81)*** 
1950 -0.011  (-3.43)***    -0.159  (-14.63)*** 
1951 -0.035  (-9.46)***    -0.186  (-15.43)*** 
1952 -0.048  (-14.44)***    -0.243  (-23.29)*** 
1953 -0.067  (-18.91)***    -0.275  (-26.19)*** 
1954 -0.081  (-23.46)***    -0.302  (-30.02)*** 
1955 -0.092  (-26.26)***    -0.347  (-34.87)*** 
1956 -0.114  (-30.55)***    -0.329  (-34.43)*** 
1957 -0.125  (-33.96)***    -0.337  (-35.25)*** 
1958 -0.129  (-33.62)***    -0.353  (-38.58)*** 
1959 -0.135  (-31.51)***    -0.350  (-34.51)*** 
1960 -0.128  (-28.94)***    -0.299  (-31.34)*** 
1961 -0.131  (-28.16)***    -0.250  (-23.15)*** 
1962 -0.126  (-33.00)***    -0.214  (-24.70)*** 
1963 -0.149  (-38.54)***    -0.156  (-19.67)*** 
1964 -0.149  (-38.29)***    -0.118  (-13.27)*** 
1965 -0.156  (-39.59)***    -0.132  (-14.00)*** 
1966 -0.153  (-37.76)***    -0.119  (-10.83)*** 
1967 -0.137  (-31.46)***    -0.139  (-10.45)*** 
1968 -0.122  (-28.37)***    -0.101  (-7.08)*** 
1969 -0.103  (-20.02)***    -0.076  (-4.09)*** 
1970 -0.088  (-14.19)***    -0.064  (-2.42)** 
          
1943 - 1970  -0.075  (-30.18)***    -0.168  (-26.88)*** 
          
1945 - 1959  -0.062  (-33.13)***    -0.221  (-33.28)*** 
          
N 1,862,914    495,503 
          
 
Note: t-ratios are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent. N 
represents number of observations. 
   43
 
Table 7: Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of One-Child Policy on the Probability of Having a 
Second Child: 1990 Census (by education level) 
  
 DD  Estimates 
















               




      
 
    
               
1943  -0.006 (-1.17)  0.009 (1.45)  -0.022 (-1.61)  -0.022 (-0.79) 
1944  0.002 (0.42)  0.012 (2.01)** 0.017  (1.32)  -0.060  (-2.24)** 
1945  -0.003 (-0.56)  0.015 (2.60)***  -0.012 (-0.90)  -0.035 (-1.31) 
1946  -0.004 (-0.73)  0.001 (0.18)  -0.027 (-2.02)**  -0.040 (-1.35) 
1947  -0.006 (-1.07)  -0.002 (-0.35) 0.015  (1.08) -0.060  (-2.18)** 
1948  -0.004 (-0.78)  0.0002 (0.03)  -0.047 (-3.55)***  -0.106 (-3.78)*** 
1949  -0.010 (-1.99)**  -0.014 (-2.72)***  -0.073 (-5.35)***  -0.131 (-4.84)*** 
1950  -0.006 (-1.17)  -0.007 (-1.38)  -0.129 (-9.21)***  -0.236 (-9.23)*** 
1951  -0.023 (-4.28)***  -0.035 (-6.10)***  -0.135 (-8.90)***  -0.278 (-10.17)*** 
1952  -0.028 (-5.78)***  -0.058 (-10.85)*** -0.171  (-11.97)*** -0.243  (-10.13)*** 
1953  -0.044 (-8.74)***  -0.072 (-12.55)*** -0.205  (-13.96)*** -0.223  (-9.81)*** 
1954  -0.048 (-9.67)***  -0.095 (-16.83)*** -0.224  (-16.07)*** -0.248  (-11.85)*** 
1955  -0.056 (-11.08)***  -0.099 (-17.12)*** -0.228  (-15.98)*** -0.284  (-14.85)*** 
1956  -0.070 (-12.83)***  -0.121 (-19.55)*** -0.222  (-15.97)*** -0.267  (-14.73)*** 
1957  -0.070 (-13.20)***  -0.127 (-20.21)*** -0.249  (-18.10)*** -0.271  (-15.18)*** 
1958  -0.061 (-10.51)***  -0.131 (-20.63)*** -0.220  (-16.26)*** -0.301  (-17.50)*** 
1959  -0.078 (-11.66)***  -0.133 (-18.51)*** -0.222  (-15.97)*** -0.233  (-12.86)*** 
1960  -0.058 (-8.87)***  -0.112 (-16.29)*** -0.190  (-14.31)*** -0.185  (-10.64)*** 
1961  -0.056 (-7.35)***  -0.113 (-14.35)*** -0.152  (-11.08)*** -0.155  (-8.53)*** 
1962  -0.051 (-8.74)***  -0.100 (-15.08)*** -0.132  (-10.40)*** -0.139  (-8.62)*** 
1963  -0.078 (-12.96)***  -0.111 (-16.88)*** -0.136  (-10.85)*** -0.093  (-6.13)*** 
1964  -0.091 (-14.67)***  -0.107 (-16.16)*** -0.118  (-9.63)***  -0.075  (-4.94)*** 
1965  -0.097 (-15.17)***  -0.121 (-18.40)*** -0.112  (-9.44)***  -0.066  (-4.12)*** 
1966  -0.131 (-19.32)***  -0.115 (-17.21)*** -0.092  (-8.07)***  -0.063  (-3.38)*** 
1967  -0.141 (-18.74)***  -0.081 (-11.87)*** -0.086  (-7.28)***  -0.022  (-0.95) 
1968  -0.128 (-16.31)***  -0.086 (-13.10)*** -0.055  (-5.04)***  -0.032  (-1.25) 
1969  -0.143 (-15.26)***  -0.054 (-7.20)*** -0.030  (-2.31)**  0.029  (0.82) 
1970  -0.081 (-7.15)***  -0.067 (-7.65)***  -0.041 (-2.49)**  -0.058 (-1.16) 
             
1943  -1970  -0.008 (-3.96)***  -0.044 (-9.19)*** -0.126  (-10.39)***  -0.155  (-10.40)*** 
             
1945  -1959  -0.032 (-16.40)***  -0.058 (-15.70)*** -0.168  (-14.33)*** -0.229  (-14.49)*** 
             
N 777,647  871,253  488,872  220,645 
              
 
Note: t-ratios are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent. 
Higher education group includes senior high school and above levels (i.e., technical school, junior college and 
university). N represents number of observations. 
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Table 8: Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of One-Child Policy on the Probability of Having a 
Second Child: 1990 Census (Rural sample, by education level) 
  
 DD  Estimates 













Junior High  School 
 and above 
(3) 
         
         
Post-Treatment          
         
1943 -0.007  (-1.37)  0.012  (1.94)*  -0.031  (-2.13)** 
1944 0.001  (0.27)  0.010  (1.66)*  -0.002  (-0.13) 
1945 -0.004  (-0.84)  0.016  (2.83)*** 0.002  (0.13) 
1946 -0.004  (-0.82)  -0.0001  (-0.01)  -0.027  (-1.93)* 
1947 -0.008  (-1.56)  0.001 (0.27)  0.007 (0.52) 
1948  -0.006  (-1.07) 0.003  (0.52) -0.021  (-1.57) 
1949 -0.011  (-2.11)**  -0.009  (-1.83)*  -0.023  (-1.74) 
1950  -0.008  (-1.54) 0.001  (0.21) -0.026  (-1.92)* 
1951  -0.023  (-4.32)*** -0.026  (-4.62)*** -0.050  (-3.18)*** 
1952  -0.028  (-5.76)*** -0.045  (-8.50)*** -0.063  (-4.01)*** 
1953  -0.043  (-8.64)*** -0.057  (-9.80)*** -0.094  (-5.74)*** 
1954 -0.046  (-9.11)***  -0.078  (-13.51)***  -0.107  (-6.59)*** 
1955  -0.053  (-10.58)*** -0.080  (-13.39)*** -0.125  (-7.44)*** 
1956  -0.067  (-12.23)*** -0.108  (-16.68)*** -0.137  (-8.02)*** 
1957  -0.066  (-12.42)*** -0.114  (-17.44)*** -0.162  (-9.39)*** 
1958 -0.055  (-9.46)***  -0.121  (-18.29)***  -0.163  (-9.37)*** 
1959  -0.074  (-10.97)*** -0.116  (-15.66)*** -0.146  (-8.05)*** 
1960 -0.053  (-7.98)***  -0.101  (-14.01)***  -0.139  (-7.59)*** 
1961 -0.058  (-7.56)***  -0.105  (-12.80)***  -0.137  (-7.27)*** 
1962 -0.049  (-8.27)***  -0.094  (-13.11)***  -0.124  (-6.55)*** 
1963  -0.075  (-12.40)*** -0.109  (-15.02)*** -0.140  (-7.30)*** 
1964  -0.090  (-14.52)*** -0.104  (-14.26)*** -0.122  (-6.50)*** 
1965  -0.098  (-15.24)*** -0.122  (-16.83)*** -0.117  (-6.45)*** 
1966  -0.131  (-19.27)*** -0.114  (-15.63)*** -0.105  (-6.15)*** 
1967  -0.140  (-18.65)*** -0.078  (-10.79)*** -0.087  (-5.42)*** 
1968  -0.128  (-16.36)*** -0.085  (-12.46)*** -0.062  (-4.41)*** 
1969 -0.144  (-15.40)***  -0.054  (-7.28)***  -0.027  (-1.91)* 
1970  -0.084  (-7.45)*** -0.065  (-7.67)*** -0.065  (-4.30)*** 
            
1943 - 1970  -0.009  (-4.01)***  -0.040  (-7.21)***  -0.113  (-6.08)*** 
            
1945 - 1959  -0.031  (-15.94)***  -0.050  (-12.44)***  -0.104  (-6.94)*** 
            
N 717,497  765,087  380,330 
            
 
Note: t-ratios are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent. 
Column 3 includes junior high school and above levels (i.e., senior high school, technical school, junior 
college and university). N represents number of observations. 
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Table 9: Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of One-Child Policy on the Probability of Having 
the Second Child: 1990 Census (Urban sample, by education level) 
  
 DD  Estimates 
















               




      
 
    
               
1943 -0.002  (-0.05) -0.011  (-0.55)  -0.021 (-0.94)  -0.018 (-0.60) 
1944 0.010  (0.31)  0.024  (1.30)  0.028 (1.34)  -0.060 (-2.08)** 
1945  0.016 (0.53)  0.004 (0.24)  -0.036 (-1.72)*  -0.034 (-1.17) 
1946  -0.018 (-0.49)  0.006 (0.33)  -0.032 (-1.45)  -0.030 (-0.92) 
1947 0.067  (1.91) -0.025  (-1.40)  0.021 (0.95)  -0.047 (-1.57) 
1948  0.028 (0.83)  -0.020 (-1.20)  -0.057 (-2.79)***  -0.114 (-3.78)*** 
1949  0.008 (0.24)  -0.047 (-2.79)***  -0.089 (-4.23)***  -0.142 (-4.91)*** 
1950  0.037 (1.23)  -0.061 (-3.37)***  -0.172 (-8.12)***  -0.260 (-9.39)*** 
1951  -0.008 (-0.22)  -0.098 (-4.40)***  -0.176 (-8.12)***  -0.322 (-10.75)*** 
1952 -0.037  (-1.15) -0.177  (-9.68)***  -0.251 (-12.69)***  -0.265 (-10.16)*** 
1953 -0.044  (-1.16) -0.243  (-12.93)***  -0.273 (-13.77)***  -0.255 (-10.56)*** 
1954 -0.151  (-4.43)***  -0.279  (-13.56)***  -0.278 (-15.05)***  -0.291 (-13.06)*** 
1955 -0.171  (-4.82)***  -0.358  (-16.59)***  -0.311 (-16.21)***  -0.328 (-16.48)*** 
1956 -0.244  (-6.43)***  -0.336  (-15.20)***  -0.299 (-16.10)***  -0.295 (-16.02)*** 
1957 -0.276  (-7.09)***  -0.347  (-14.01)***  -0.327 (-17.83)***  -0.286 (-16.25)*** 
1958 -0.374  (-9.77)***  -0.318  (-13.13)***  -0.355 (-20.18)***  -0.297 (-17.32)*** 
1959 -0.332  (-7.71)***  -0.460  (-15.81)***  -0.329 (-16.64)***  -0.280 (-15.54)*** 
1960 -0.392  (-10.43)***  -0.419  (-14.53)***  -0.281 (-15.17)***  -0.204 (-11.90)*** 
1961  -0.207 (-4.12)***  -0.442 (-12.95)***  -0.211 (-9.65)***  -0.174 (-9.54)*** 
1962  -0.326 (-7.87)***  -0.401 (-12.59)***  -0.254 (-15.30)***  -0.099 (-6.59)*** 
1963  -0.464 (-9.86)***  -0.324 (-11.48)***  -0.139 (-9.21)***  -0.085 (-6.16)*** 
1964  -0.304 (-5.91)***  -0.321 (-8.07)***  -0.091 (-5.83)***  -0.069 (-4.44)*** 
1965  -0.214 (-3.75)***  -0.209 (-6.74)***  -0.146 (-9.31)***  -0.041 (-2.40)** 
1966  -0.328 (-4.52)***  -0.242 (-7.14)***  -0.094 (-5.39)***  -0.050 (-2.38)** 
1967  -0.289 (-4.10)***  -0.274 (-7.01)***  -0.142 (-6.94)***  -0.004 (-0.15) 
1968  -0.284 (-3.14)***  -0.190 (-4.73)***  -0.081 (-3.68)***  -0.042 (-1.50) 
1969 -0.164  (-1.92)*  -0.091  (-1.90)*  -0.082 (-2.97)***  0.013 (0.32) 
1970 0.119  (0.96) -0.216  (-3.62)***  -0.039 (-1.07)  0.028 (0.41) 
              
1943 -1970  -0.023 (-2.31)**  -0.105 (-10.28)***  -0.163 (-11.11)***  -0.154 (-11.32)*** 
              
1945 -1959  -0.054 (-4.82)***  -0.133 (-12.91)***  -0.217 (-14.00)***  -0.243 (-15.83)*** 
              
N  60,150  106,166 171,525 157,662 
              
 
Note: t-ratios are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent. 
Higher education group includes senior high school and above levels (i.e., technical school, junior college and 
university). N represents number of observations. 
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Table 10: Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of One-Child Policy on the Probability of Having 
a First Child and Being Married: 1990 Census 
  




Dependent Variable:  
Probability of having a first child 
(Restricted Sample) 
(1) 
 Dependent  Variable:   
Probability of being married 
(Unrestricted Sample) 
(2) 
          
Post-Treatment           
          
1943 -0.003  (-1.33)    0.001  (1.59) 
1944 0.002  (0.82)    -0.001  (-1.13) 
1945 -0.004  (-1.55)    -0.001  (-1.72)* 
1946 -0.004  (-1.92)*    -0.002  (-2.06)** 
1947 0.001  (0.28)    0.0005  (0.62) 
1948 -0.001  (-0.59)    -0.003  (-4.02)*** 
1949 -0.003  (-1.26)    -0.002  (-2.73)*** 
1950 0.002  (1.25)    -0.001  (-1.39) 
1951 -0.006  (-2.57)***    0.001  (1.46) 
1952 -0.001  (-0.51)    -0.001  (-1.99)** 
1953 -0.003  (-1.57)    -0.003  (-4.76)*** 
1954 -0.004  (-2.05)**    -0.002  (-2.43)** 
1955 -0.003  (-1.82)**    -0.004  (-6.33)*** 
1956 -0.002  (-1.00)    -0.001  (-1.30) 
1957 -0.001  (-0.54)    -0.003  (-4.56)*** 
1958 -0.003  (-1.35)    0.001  (1.69)* 
1959 -0.008  (-3.30)***    -0.002  (-2.91)*** 
1960 0.002  (0.95)    0.001  (0.90) 
1961 0.0001  (0.04)    0.002  (2.26)** 
1962 -0.0004  (-0.22)    0.004  (4.56)*** 
1963 -0.004  (-1.91)*    0.005  (4.99)*** 
1964 -0.008  (-3.75)***    0.010  (8.46)*** 
1965 -0.013  (-5.48)***    0.008  (5.53)*** 
1966 -0.022  (-8.49)***    0.003  (1.47) 
1967 -0.032  (-10.77)***    -0.023  (-10.88)*** 
1968 -0.038  (-11.84)***    -0.064  (-28.51)*** 
1969 -0.064  (-16.95)***    -0.102  (-47.37)*** 
1970 -0.113  (-25.64)***    -0.138  (-76.85)*** 
          
1943 - 1970  0.001  (0.84)    0.007  (4.56)*** 
          
1945 - 1959  -0.003  (-3.66)***    -0.002  (-4.86)*** 
          
N 2,358,417    3,155,695 
          
 
Note: t-ratios are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent. 
The restricted sample (as used in this paper) refers to women who are household head or spouse of the head, 
with age between 20 and 64 at the census years.  The unrestricted sample expands to all women aged between 
20 and 64.  Both regressions include education, rural and provincial dummies. N represents number of 
observations. 
 
 